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Abstract—In this research work, security concepts are formal-
ized in steganography, and the common paradigms based on
information theory are replaced by another ones inspired from
cryptography, more practicable are closer than what is usually
done in other cryptographic domains. These preliminaries lead
to a first proof of a cryptographically secure information hiding
scheme.
Index Terms—Information hiding; Steganography; Security;
Cryptographic proofs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The usual manner for preserving privacy when communi-
cating over public channels is by using cryptographic tools.
Users cipher the data and send them over possibly insecure
networks. Even if a third party intercepts these data, he or
she will not understand them without having the secret key
for deciphering. In that well investigated scenario, anyone
knows that a private message is transmitted through the public
channel, but only authorized individuals (i.e., owners of the
secret key) can understand it.
A second approach investigated over two decades [6], and
usually referred as information hiding or steganography [2],
[9], aims at inserting a secret message into an innocent cover,
in such a way that observers cannot detect the existence of
this hidden channel (for instance, images sent through the
Internet). The goal in this field is to appear as innocent
as possible: observers should not think that something goes
wrong with this public channel. It must not cross their mind
that sometimes the public channel is used to transmit hidden
messages. In that context, an attack is succeeded when the
sleazy character of the channel is detected. Tools used in that
field are mainly based on artificial intelligence. They are called
steganalyzers, and their main objective is to detect whether a
given communication channel is possibly steganographied, or
if it only contains “natural” images. In case of detection, the
unique countermeasure proposed by the literature is to stop
the sleazy communication by closing the channel. To sum
up, the steganography community currently only focuses on
the ability to detect hidden channels, without investigating the
consequences of this detection [3], [11].
However, observers have not necessarily the ability or the
desire to stop the communication. For instance, who can
switch off the Internet? Furthermore, by stopping the faked
channel, attackers miss the opportunity to obtain more infor-
mation about the secret message and the intended receiver.
Finally, if attackers observe the communication, man can
reasonably think that they already knew in advance that this
channel is sleazy (if not, why they observe it?). The use
of a steganalyzer on a channel only appears in the best
situation as a reinforcement of their doubts or fears. In most
operational contexts, only sleazy channels are observed, and
the questions are finally to determine [4]: (1) when the hidden
messages have been transmitted in this channel (among all
the possibly faked images, how to determine the ones that
really contain hidden information?), (2) what was the content
of this message, and perhaps (3) who was the receiver among
the observers. These questions make sense only within a
stegranographic context, that is, when the channel is not
ciphered. However, these important questionings have never
been regarded by the information hiding community.
In this paper, authors provide a cryptographic theoretical
framework to study this scenario related to steganography.
Concrete illustrative examples of this framework of study
are given thereafter. A first toy example is the hypothetical
case of a dissident blogger in a totalitarian state, who posts
regularly and publicly information in his or her blog, while
being severely watched by the authorities. This blogger wants
to transmit one day a secret message or a signal to an observer
into confidence, without sounding the alarm in the authorities
side. Another example is an individual who is invigilated,
because he is correctly suspected to be a spy. This agent
cannot be arrested on a simple presumption, or on the claim
that the images he sent in his emails look sleazy. Despite this
surveillance, this spy wants to transmit one day a message
to his sponsor. The observers want to determine if an hidden
message is really transmitted or not, to have a proof of such a
transmission, together with the content of the message, the
date of transmission, and the targeted receiver if possible.
Obviously, these situations are related to both cryptography
and steganography, however there is currently a lack of tool
allowing their study. The key idea of this research work is
to propose algorithms such that observers cannot switch from
doubts (sleazy channels) to certainties or proofs.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In
Section II, generalities from steganography are discussed. The
key concepts and main results are presented in Section III.
Finally, Section IV concludes this research work and details
further investigations.
II. NOTIONS AND TERMINOLOGIES IN INFORMATION
HIDING
In the following some common notions in the field of
information hiding are recalled. We refer to [1] for a complete
survey of this subject.
A. Information Hiding Security
Robustness and security are two major concerns in infor-
mation hiding. These two concerns have been defined in [12]
as follows. “Robust watermarking is a mechanism to create
a communication channel that is multiplexed into original
content [...]. It is required that, firstly, the perceptual degra-
dation of the marked content [...] is minimal and, secondly,
that the capacity of the watermark channel degrades as a
smooth function of the degradation of the marked content. [...].
Watermarking security refers to the inability by unauthorized
users to have access to the raw watermarking channel [...]
to remove, detect and estimate, write or modify the raw
watermarking bits.”
In the framework of watermarking and steganography, se-
curity has seen several important developments since the last
decade [5], [8], [13]. The first fundamental work in security
was made by Cachin in the context of steganography [6].
Cachin interprets the attempts of an attacker to distinguish
between an innocent image and a stego-content as a hypothesis
testing problem. In this document, the basic properties of a
stegosystem are defined using the notions of entropy, mutual
information, and relative entropy. Mittelholzer, inspired by the
work of Cachin, proposed the first theoretical framework for
analyzing the security of a watermarking scheme [15].
These efforts to bring a theoretical framework for security
in steganography and watermarking have been followed up by
Kalker, who tries to clarify the concepts (robustness vs. secu-
rity), and the classifications of watermarking attacks [12]. This
work has been deepened by Furon et al., who have translated
Kerckhoffs’ principle (Alice and Bob shall only rely on some
previously shared secret for privacy), from cryptography to
data hiding [10]. They used Diffie and Hellman methodology,
and Shannon’s cryptographic framework [17], to classify the
watermarking attacks into categories, according to the type of
information Eve has access to [8], [16], namely: Watermarked
Only Attack (WOA), Known Message Attack (KMA), Known
Original Attack (KOA), and Constant-Message Attack (CMA).
Levels of security have been recently defined in these setups.
The highest level of security in WOA is called stego-security
[7], recalled below.
In the prisoner problem of Simmons [18], Alice and Bob
are in jail, and they want to, possibly, devise an escape plan
by exchanging hidden messages in innocent-looking cover
contents. These messages are to be conveyed to one another
by a common warden, Eve, who over-drops all contents and
can choose to interrupt the communication if they appear to be
stego-contents. The stego-security, defined in this framework,
is the highest security level in WOA setup [7]. To recall it,
we need the following notations:
• K is the set of embedding keys,
• p(X) is the probabilistic model of N0 initial host con-
tents,
• p(Y |K1) is the probabilistic model of N0 watermarked
contents.
Furthermore, it is supposed in this context that each host
content has been watermarked with the same secret key K1
and the same embedding function e. It is now possible to
define the notion of stego-security.
Definition 1 (Stego-Security): The embedding function e is
stego-secure if and only if:
∀K1 ∈ K, p(Y |K1) = p(X).
This definition is almost always considered as not really
tractable in practice, reasons explaining this mistrust are
outlined in the following section. This is the reason why
the information hiding community majorly focuses on the
construction of steganalyzers, supposed to be able to determine
whether a given communication channel appears to transmit
steganographied messages or not.
B. Drawbacks of the Stego-Security Notion
Theoretically speaking, the stego-security notion matches
well with the idea of a perfect secrecy in the WOA category
of attacks. However, its concrete verification raises several
technical problems difficult to get around. These difficulties
impact drastically the effective security of the scheme.
For instance, in a stego-secure scheme, the distribution of
the set of watermarked images must be the same than the
one of the original contents, no matter the chosen keys. But
how to determine practically the distribution of the original
contents? Furthermore, claiming that Alice can constitutes
her own subset of well-chosen images having the same
“good” distribution is quite unreasonable in several contexts
of steganography: Alice has not always the choice of the
supports. Moreover, it introduces a kind of bias, as the warden
can find such similarities surprising. Suppose however that
Alice is in the best situation for her, that is, she has the
possibility to constitute herself the set of original contents.
How can she proceed practically to be certain that all media
into the set follow a same distribution p(X)? According to the
authors opinion, Alice has two possible choices:
1) Either she constitutes the set by testing, for each new
content, whether this media has a same distribution than
the ones that have been already selected.
2) Or she forges directly new images by using existing
ones. For instance, she can replace all the least sig-
nificant bits of the original contents by using a good
pseudorandom number generator.
In the first situation, Alice will realize a χ2 test, or other
statistical tests of this kind, to determine if the considered im-
age (its least significant bits, or its low frequency coefficients,
etc.) has a same distribution than images already selected.
In that situation, Alice does not have the liberty to choose
the distribution, and it seems impossible to find a scheme
being able to preserve any kind of distribution, for all secret
keys and all hidden messages. Furthermore, such statistical
hypothesis testing are not ideal ones, as they only regard if a
result is unlikely to have occurred by chance alone according
to a pre-determined threshold probability (the significance
level). Errors of the first (false positive) and second kind (false
negative) occur necessarily, with a certain probability. In other
words, with such an approach, Alice cannot design a perfect
set of cover contents having all the same probability p(X).
This process leads to a set of media that follows a distribution
Alice does not have access to.
The second situation seems more realistic, it will thus be
further investigated in the next section.
III. TOWARD A CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY SECURE HIDING
In this section a theoretical framework for information
hiding security is proposed, which is more closely resembling
that of usual approaches in cryptography. It allows to define the
notion of steganalyzers, it is compatible with the new original
scenarios of information hiding that have been dressed in the
previous sections, and it does not have the drawbacks of the
stego-security definition.
A. Introduction
Almost all branches in cryptology have a complexity ap-
proach for security. For instance, in a cryptographic context,
a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) is a deterministic
algorithm G transforming strings of length ℓ into strings of
length M , with M > ℓ. The notion of secure PRNG can be
defined as follows [19].
Definition 2: Let D : BM −→ B be a probabilistic
algorithm that runs in time T . Let ε > 0. D is called a
(T, ε)−distinguishing attack on pseudorandom generator G if
∣
∣
∣Pr[D(G(k)) = 1 | k ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ]− Pr[D(s) = 1 | s ∈R B
M ]
∣
∣
∣ > ε,
where the probability is taken over the internal coin flips of
D, and the notation “∈R” indicates the process of selecting an
element at random and uniformly over the corresponding set.
Let us recall that the running time of a probabilistic algo-
rithm is defined to be the maximum of the expected number of
steps needed to produce an output, maximized over all inputs;
the expected number is averaged over all coin flips made by
the algorithm [14]. We are now able to recall the notion of
cryptographically secure PRNG.
Definition 3: A pseudorandom generator is (T, ε)−secure
if there exists no (T, ε)−distinguishing attack on this pseudo-
random generator.
Intuitively, it means that no polynomial-time algorithm can
make a distinction, with a non-negligible probability, between
a truly random generator and G.
Inspired by these kind of definitions, we propose what
follows.
B. Definition of a stegosystem
Definition 4 (Stegosystem): Let S,M, and K = Bℓ three
sets of words on B called respectively the sets of supports, of
messages, and of keys (of size ℓ).
A stegosystem on (S,M,K) is a tuple (I, E , inv) such that:
• I is a function from S × M × K to S, (s,m, k) 7−→
I(s,m, k) = s′,
• E is a function from S × K to M, (s, k) 7−→ E(s, k) =
m′.
• inv is a function from K to K,
s.t. ∀k ∈ K, ∀(s,m) ∈ S × M,
E(I(s,m, k), inv(k)) = m.
• I(s,m, k) and E(c, k′) can be computed in polynomial
time.
I is called the insertion or embedding function, E the extrac-
tion function, s the host content, m the hidden message, k
the embedding key, k′ = inv(k) the extraction key, and s′ is
the stego-content. If ∀k ∈ K, k = inv(k), the stegosystem is
symmetric (private-key), otherwise it is asymmetric (public-
key).
C. Heading Notions
Definition 5 ((T, ε)−distinguishing attack): Let S =
(I, E , inv) a stegosystem on (A,M,K), with A ⊂ BM .
A (T, ε)−distinguishing attack on the stegosystem S is a
probabilistic algorithm D : A −→ {0, 1} in running time T ,
such that there exists m ∈M,
|Pr [D (I(s,m, k)) = 1 | k ∈R K, s ∈R A]
−Pr [D (x) = 1 | x ∈R A]| > ε,
where the probability is also taken over the internal coin flips
of D, and the notation ∈R indicates the process of selecting
an element at random and uniformly over the corresponding
set.
Definition 6: A stegosystem is (T, ε)−undistinguishable if
there exists no (T, ε)−distinguishing attack on this stegosys-
tem.
Intuitively, it means that there is no polynomial-time prob-
abilistic algorithm being able to distinguish the host contents
from the stego-contents
D. A Cryptographically Secure Information Hiding Scheme
Theorem 1: Let
S =
{
s11, s
1
2, . . . , s
1
2N , s
2
1, s
2
2, . . . , s
2
2N , . . . , s
r
1, s
r
2, . . . , s
r
2N
}
a subset of BM = A. Consider G : BL −→
B
N a (T, ε)−secure pseudorandom number generator, and
I(sij ,m, k) = s
i
m⊕G(k). Assuming that r is a constant, and
that from i, j one can compute the image sij in time T1, the
steosystem is (T − T1 −N − 1, ε)-secure.
Intuitively, S is built from r images containing N bits of
low information. The image sij corresponds to the i-th image
where the N bits are set to j.
Proof 1: Assume there exists a (T ′, ε) distinguisher D′for
the stego-system. Therefore, there exists m0 such that
∣∣Pr (D′ (I(s,m0, k)) = 1 | k ∈R Bℓ, s ∈R S
)
−Pr (D′ (x) = 1 | x ∈R S)| > ε
(1)
Choosing randomly and uniformly s ∈ S is equivalent to
choose uniformly and randomly i ∈ {1, . . . , r} and j ∈
{1, . . . , 2N}. Therfore (1) is equivalent to∣∣∣Pr
(
D′
(
si
m0⊕G(k)
)
= 1 | k ∈R B
ℓ, i ∈R {1, . . . , r}
)
−Pr (D′ (x) = 1 | x ∈R S)| > ε
(2)
Let D be the distinguisher for G defined for y ∈ {0, 1}N
into {0, 1} by:
1) Pick randomly and uniformly i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
2) Compute s = sim0⊕y .
3) Return D′(s).
The complexity of this probabilistic algorithm is 1 for the first
step since r is a constant, T1+N for the second step, and T
′
for the last one. Thus it works in thime T ′ + T1 + 1 +N .
Now we claim that D is a (T ′+T1+1+N, ε)-distinguisher
for G. Indeed,
Pr
(
D (y) = 1 | y ∈R {0, 2
N}
)
=Pr
(
D′
(
siy
)
= 1 | y ∈R {0, 2
N}, i ∈R {1, . . . , r}
)
=Pr (D′ (x) = 1 | x ∈R S) .
Moreover,
Pr
(
D (G(k)) = 1 | k ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ
)
=Pr
(
D′
(
sim0⊕G(k)
)
= 1 | k ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ, i ∈R {1, . . . , r}
)
.
Therefore, using (2), one has∣∣Pr[D(G(k)) = 1 | k ∈R {0, 1}ℓ]
−Pr[D(s) = 1 | s ∈R B
M ]
∣∣ > ε, (3)
proving that D is a (T ′ + T1 + 1+N, ε)-distinguisher for G,
which concludes the proof.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this research work, a new rigorous approach for secure
steganography, based on the complexity theory, has been
proposed. This work has been inspired by the definitions
of security that can usually be found in other branches of
cryptology. We have proposed a new understanding for the
notion of secure hiding and presented a first secure information
hiding scheme. The intention was to prove the existence
of such a scheme and to give a rigorous cryptographical
framework for steganography.
In future work, we will investigate the situation where de-
tection is impossible. In that case, we will consider both weak
indistinguability (using a statistical or a complexity approach,
with the cryptographically secure definition of PRNGs) and
strong indistinguability (using the well known CC1 and CC2
sets). Additionally, we will reconsider and improve the defi-
nitions of security in the information hiding literature that are
based on the signal theory. Among other thing, we will take
into account a Shannon entropy that is not reduced to simple
1-bit blocs. Finally, we will show that tests using generators
allow to attack information hiding schemes that are secure
for the statistical approach, as LSB are not uniform in that
situation.
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